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Will the G20 agree to the reforms needed to make the IMF an
effective part of international financial governance? The
prospects are grim because it would require difficult political
compromises or amendments to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.
Yet reforms are needed to address the IMF’s coordination with
other international institutions, the scope of the financial
regulatory regime, and its representative legitimacy. This column
some initial steps the G20 might take.
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The three major problems in
the international financial
architecture
The three key problems are coordination, scope, and legitimacy.
Coordination

Global financial governance currently involves a multiplicity of
formally uncoordinated organisations and mechanisms. These
include separate international bodies for banking regulators,
capital markets, and insurance companies, the Financial Stability
Forum, which coordinates regulators in a select group of
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countries but has no global mandate, the IMF, which plays some
role in overseeing some financial issues in some member states,
the World Bank, which helps member states improve their
financial systems, the WTO, which deals with issues relating to
establishment of financial institutions, and the G7 and G20,
whose efficacy is unclear (Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell
2006).
Lacking an effective coordination mechanism, the international
community resorts to ad hoc crisis-driven measures. For example,
the IMF, in response to previous financial crises in its key
member states, has assumed a role in the oversight of capital
markets and national financial systems, even though it was
designed as an international monetary institution. This approach
is problematic from a legal and global governance perspective,
raising concerns about the scope of the IMF’s mandate and its
relations with its member states.
Scope
The scope of current financial regulatory regimes is deficient in
two ways. First, they do not cover all relevant products and
participants. They also do not incorporate all significant issues,
for example climate change, even though many financial
institutions recognise it as a source of financial risk1 and the
climate change negotiations could result in significant new
financial flows to developing countries.
Legitimacy
There are three aspects to the legitimacy problem. First is
representation. This involves, in relation to the IMF, both
ensuring that member states receive a vote that is commensurate
with their role in global economic affairs (Rueda-Sabater,
Ramachandran, Kraft 2009), and that those states that actually
consume IMF services have a meaningful voice in its decisionmaking bodies. A related issue is the asymmetry in the IMF’s
relations with its members – the most powerful states in fact, but
not in law, are less subject to its jurisdiction than weak states.
IMF member states have already agreed on limited adjustments in
the voting power of some members. Unfortunately, reaching this
agreement was hard and may have consumed much of the
available political will for dealing with this topic – despite the
rhetoric to the contrary.
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The second aspect of the legitimacy problem is the scope of
institutional authority. The IMF’s legal mandate has not changed
since its creation, even though the range of its operations has. For
example, it now deals with financial governance issues that
involve it more deeply in the internal affairs of its member states
than its creators envisaged. Consequently, the IMF’s mandate
needs updating to ensure consistency with its evolving role.
Third is accountability. As the IMF’s mission grows, it needs to
be appropriately accountable to those member states and their
citizens that are directly affected by its operations but have
limited say in its governance. In addition, as its operations
become more complex, it needs enhanced management and staff
accountability to the Board.

The G20 London meeting and
IMF reform
An IMF capable of assuming its envisaged governance roles
needs a clear mandate, meaningful participation by all members,
transparent operational policies and procedures, and effective
accountability mechanisms. There are a number of actions that
the G20 may take in London to promote this goal.
The first is a significant increase in IMF financing through
expansion of the New Agreement to Borrow (NAB). However,
this action, whether or not it is based on the ambitious US
proposal, will both mitigate and exacerbate the IMF’s legitimacy
problems. The increase in NAB membership will give some IMF
member states additional say in IMF operations. However,
merely increasing the IMF’s resources and authority will
exacerbate its accountability and scope problems. The IMF can
offset this problem by adopting transparent operational policies
and procedures and authorising an enhanced role for the
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) in assessing their use.
Additional actions will be needed to plug the gap in development
financing. One option is for countries that have established IMF
trust funds to agree to expand their uses. At the same time, they
should require improved transparency and accountability in the
IMF’s management of these trusts. Another option is a new issue
of special drawing rights. While this idea is attractive, the
required approval process is slow and unpredictable.

A second likely action is agreement on merit-based selection of
the IMF Managing Director. The significance of this change
should not be overstated because there are many ways for
powerful countries to ensure that “their” candidate (regardless of
nationality) is appointed.
Another issue that may receive attention is the representativeness
and role of the IMF Board. Making the Board more democratic
depends on European countries surrendering some Board seats.
Despite their calls for greater fairness in IMF voting and
representation, European countries are unlikely to accept this
change without some compensation. Thus, absent some “grand
bargain” it is unlikely that the political will to reform either the
Board or IMF voting exists.
This issue should be considered in conjunction with the proposal
to create the “Council” to replace the IFMC. This Council,
anticipated in Schedule D of the IMF Articles, would have the
same composition and voting arrangements as the Board.
Consequently, it would not resolve the IMF’s representational
problems and would merely replace an advisory body with a
decision-making body.
The debate over the Board’s role is whether or not it should
surrender its operational responsibilities and concentrate on
strategic issues. This reformed Board could meet less frequently
and its Directors need not be based in Washington. This would
result in the management and staff having greater operational
responsibilities, thereby underscoring the internal accountability
problem at the IMF. This could be addressed by both improving
the IMF’s operational policies and procedures and expanding the
responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Office.
The London meeting can initiate but not conclude consideration
of reforms in the IMF’s oversight, coordination, enforcement and
advisory functions. The IMF already performs versions of these
functions in its consumer member states but not in its richer
member states. Without addressing this asymmetry, the IMF will
not have the credibility to be a fair coordinator of international
financial governance arrangements.
In addition, the IMF cannot effectively perform these functions
unless it has the legal authority to address the full scope of
international financial governance issues. This requires amending
its Articles because some issues are outside its current mandate.
Given that amending the Articles involves the same ratification

process as approving a new treaty, might the international
community be better served by creating a new institution that
better reflects current geopolitical realities and international
financial needs than to reform an organisation that has serious
legitimacy and legacy problems?

Conclusion
The world needs the IMF. But, it also needs an organisation that
does not have the scope, function, and legitimacy problems that
plague the IMF. While resolving these issues is a long-term
process, the G20 can begin by increasing the IMF’s resources,
enhancing its accountability to all its internal and external
stakeholders, and making its operational policies and procedures
more transparent.

Footnote
1 See, for example, www.equator-principles.com
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